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Abstract
Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States,
we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that
disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative
lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings,
and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-
K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws
affect firms’ disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate dis-
closure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex ante derivative litigation risk and
higher operating uncertainty, as well as firms for which shareholder litigation is a more
important mechanism to discipline managers.
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1 Introduction
Corporate governance is a nexus of mechanisms to ensure that managers’ interests are
aligned with those of shareholders (Jensen [1993], Shleifer and Vishny [1997]). Prior literature
shows that lawsuits brought by shareholders play an important role in reducing agency con-
flicts between managers and shareholders (e.g., Cheng et al. [2010]). After all, shareholders
can effectively discipline managers only if they pose a credible threat to managers. Share-
holders also require timely and reliable disclosure to efficiently monitor managers (Armstrong
et al. [2010]). But how exactly shareholder litigation interacts with corporate disclosure to
align managers’ and shareholders’ interests is not entirely understood (Armstrong et al.
[2010]). In this paper, we exploit unexpected regulatory changes that affect shareholders’
ability to pursue derivative lawsuits to examine the effect of shareholder litigation on a firm’s
disclosure decisions.1
Specifically, we use the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws across dif-
ferent U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in the threat of derivative lawsuits to
identify the causal effect of changes to shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure.
UD laws require derivative plaintiffs (i.e., shareholders) to make a demand on a firm’s board
of directors before filing a derivative lawsuit. The board of directors usually refuses this
request since most of the members are named as defendants in the lawsuit. Hence, the
adoption of UD laws imposes a significant hurdle for shareholders to file derivative lawsuits.
Consequently, the litigation risk pertaining to derivative lawsuits has decreased significantly
following the passage of UD laws (Appel [2016]).
Derivative lawsuits are lawsuits brought by shareholders in the name of the firm to sue
its management. They are a mechanism to enforce managers’ fiduciary duties and force
managers to compensate the firm for the damage they allegedly caused. The settlements
1An important difference between our study and the prior literature on the relation between shareholder
litigation and corporate disclosure (e.g., Johnson et al. [2001]) is that our study does not exclusively rely
on the assumption that corporate disclosure can trigger shareholder litigation. We argue that shareholder
litigation can also influence corporate disclosure indirectly through its role as a governance tool.
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of derivative lawsuits often come at significant costs to managers. First, derivative lawsuits
may lead to direct pecuniary costs (Erickson [2010]) and reputational penalties (Brochet and
Srinivasan [2014]). Second, the settlements of derivative lawsuits often contain corporate
governance reforms that reduce managerial entrenchment. For example, Ferris et al. [2007]
find that the settlements of derivative lawsuits are followed by an increase in the number of
independent directors. Thus, derivative lawsuits not only have a direct impact on managers
but also have an indirect effect on the firm’s corporate governance structure.
We hypothesize that the decrease in the derivative litigation risk can affect firms’ dis-
closure policies directly through changes in expected costs and benefits related to potential
derivative lawsuits and indirectly via the role of derivative lawsuits as a corporate governance
tool. First, the change in expected litigation costs such as monetary payoffs and reputational
damage can alter managers’ incentives to disclose information. Specifically, managers trade
off costs and benefits when deciding whether to disclose private information. On the one
hand, managers may voluntarily disclose bad news because such disclosures may prevent
litigation in cases of large stock price declines (Skinner [1994]). If so, when the threat of
derivative lawsuits decreases, the marginal benefit of disclosing bad news also decreases. As
a result, managers may opportunistically reduce bad news disclosure. On the other hand,
managers may avoid voluntarily disclosing forward-looking information because such dis-
closures may invite future shareholder lawsuits (Johnson et al. [2001], Rogers and Stocken
[2005]). Hence, when the decreased derivative litigation risk reduces the marginal cost of
such disclosures, managers may be more willing to disclose.
Second, the reduction in the threat of derivative lawsuits can also affect disclosure poli-
cies indirectly through the role of derivative lawsuits as a corporate governance mechanism.
Appel [2016] argues that derivative lawsuits play an important role in disciplining managers.
He shows that a decrease in the derivative litigation risk can weaken firms’ corporate gov-
ernance quality and lead to an increase in governance provisions (e.g., classified boards)
that entrench managers. This creates two opposing effects on firms’ disclosure policies. On
3
the one hand, the decrease in the derivative lawsuit risk can reduce shareholders’ ability to
discipline managers using shareholder litigation rights, which in turn increases shareholders’
demand for more information to monitor managers. For example, for firms where derivative
lawsuits are a more important governance tool for shareholders to discipline managers, the
demand for corporate disclosure should be stronger following the decrease in the derivative
litigation risk. On the other hand, the reduction in the threat of derivative lawsuits can lead
to more managerial entrenchment, which may affect managers’ incentives for disclosure. For
example, entrenched managers may want to stay opaque and share less information with the
capital markets in order to enjoy private benefits (e.g., Ferreira and Laux [2007]).
Therefore, it is unclear ex ante whether and how the decrease in the derivative lawsuit risk
can affect firms’ disclosure policies. Our main empirical finding is consistent with an increase
in corporate disclosure in response to a reduction in the threat of derivative lawsuits due to
the passage of UD laws. Specifically, we first document that firms significantly increase the
frequency of management earnings forecasts following the adoption of UD laws. Attesting
to the economic importance of earnings forecasts, Beyer et al. [2010] state that 16% of
stock return variance is explained by guidance disclosure (which is more than all SEC filings
and press releases combined). In addition, we recognize that corporate disclosure comes in
many forms, and therefore we complement the frequency of management earnings forecasts
with the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in 10-K filings and the
frequency of voluntary 8-K filings. We find that firms also increase the length of MD&A and
the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings after the adoption of UD laws.
We further attempt to distinguish among the direct and indirect channels through which
the increase in the disclosure operates. We find evidence that the effect of UD laws on corpo-
rate disclosure is driven by firms that face relatively higher ex ante derivative lawsuit risk. In
particular, firms operating in relatively more uncertain environments significantly increase
their disclosure because it is harder for them to predict future outcomes ex ante, and thus
they were more exposed to lawsuits related to disclosures that could be viewed as misleading
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ex post prior to the adoption of UD laws. These results are consistent with the argument
that the change in expected litigation costs affects managers’ incentives to disclose. Fur-
thermore, firms that have dispersed institutional ownership also exhibit significant increases
in corporate disclosure, which suggests that derivative lawsuits are particularly important
when alternative corporate governance mechanisms are weak. Taken together, our results
indicate that UD laws affect corporate disclosure not only directly through the change in
expected litigation costs but also indirectly via the reduced role of derivative lawsuits as a
governance tool.
We then investigate whether UD laws increase managers’ willingness to share more in-
formation with shareholders or lead to more opportunistic disclosure behavior. Such an
investigation is important because it helps us distinguish whether shareholder litigation risk
reduces the overall disclosure level or disciplines managers’ opportunistic disclosure behav-
ior. If shareholder litigation risk discourages the overall amount of information disclosed, the
decrease in the litigation risk provides potential benefits to the capital markets in terms of
more information sharing regardless of the nature of the news (e.g., bad versus good news).
Our findings show that UD laws increase the disclosure frequencies of both good and bad
news, and both optimistic and pessimistic news, in a similar way. Moreover, the precision and
quality of disclosed information also improve following the adoption of UD laws. Specifically,
the width of earnings forecast errors becomes smaller and the level of discretionary accruals
decreases. Overall, UD laws seem to incentivize managers to share more and better-quality
information with shareholders rather than exercise more opportunistic disclosure behavior.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, by exploiting the passage
of UD laws as an exogenous change in shareholder litigation risk, we provide cleaner evidence
on the causal relationship between shareholder litigation and corporate disclosure. Many of
the prior studies that examine the relation between shareholder litigation risk and corporate
disclosure are subject to significant measurement errors and endogeneity concerns. For ex-
ample, ex ante firm characteristics, industry membership, and ex post filings of class action
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lawsuits have been used in the literature to proxy for shareholder litigation risk (Francis
et al. [1994], Field et al. [2005], Kim and Skinner [2012]). These measures are either endoge-
nously determined by firm fundamentals or confounded by industry characteristics, both
of which cast doubt on the credibility of the findings built on them. Because we use the
staggered adoption of UD laws as an exogenous shock to the litigation risk, our results are
less susceptible to the measurement errors and endogeneity concerns that are widespread in
the existing literature.
Second, our study also broadens the understanding of the role of shareholder litigation
in corporate disclosure. There is a significant body of accounting literature on the direct
role of shareholder litigation in shaping corporate disclosure policies (e.g., Skinner [1994;
1997], Johnson et al. [2001], Field et al. [2005]). These studies focus on whether expected
litigation risk deters managers from disclosing forward-looking information or encourages
them to disclose more information. We add to this literature by taking into account the
indirect role of shareholder litigation risk in facilitating corporate disclosure via corporate
governance. We thereby provide comprehensive evidence on the channels through which
shareholder litigation affects corporate disclosure.
Finally, our study is closely related to the growing literature on the role of shareholder
litigation in corporate decisions (e.g., Cheng et al. [2010], Chu and Zhao [2015], Appel
[2016]). Using the enactment of UD laws as an exogenous shock to shareholder litigation,
Appel [2016] studies its effect on firms’ governance, compensation, and financing policies. We
add to this literature by showing that UD laws also affect corporate disclosure. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that there are also benefits associated with weakened shareholder litigation:
increased disclosure provided by firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional back-
ground. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses. We describe the research design and
variable measurement in Section 4. We present the results in Section 5. We provide some
additional analyses in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
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2 Institutional Background
Shareholder litigation plays an important role in enforcing managers’ fiduciary duties
and securities laws in the United States. For instance, derivative lawsuits are the procedural
mechanism to implement state fiduciary duty laws, while securities class actions are the
mechanism to enforce federal securities laws. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) limits shareholders’ ability to file class action lawsuits. However, it does not
affect the conditions for filing derivative lawsuits. Consequently, many shareholders have
diverted their efforts from class action lawsuits to derivative lawsuits in the post-PSLRA
years (Erickson [2010]).
A derivative lawsuit allows shareholders, acting on behalf of the firm, to sue managers
for their alleged wrongdoings. Examples of wrongdoing include managers’ illegal activities,
mishandling of information, or self-dealing. In a derivative lawsuit, the firm is the actual
plaintiff, and the shareholders who initiate the lawsuit are the derivative plaintiffs. The
objective of the derivative lawsuit is to enforce managers’ fiduciary duties and force managers
to compensate the firm for the damage they allegedly caused.
A significant number of derivative lawsuits are settled, and these settlements can involve
financial remuneration and/or corporate governance reforms (Erickson [2010]). Although
directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance can cover the monetary losses of derivative
lawsuits, D&O insurance does not cover wrongdoings that involve managers’ dishonesty,
intentional misconduct, or breaches in which managers have reaped a personal gain (Cox
[1999]). Hence, D&O insurance does not completely shield managers from financial liabilities
resulting from derivative lawsuits. Even if managers do not suffer from any financial penalties
related to derivative lawsuits, their reputations can be damaged if they are implicated in
lawsuits (Cox [1999]). A damaged reputation can in turn negatively affect managers’ future
career prospects (Strahan [1998], Brochet and Srinivasan [2014]). Furthermore, derivative
lawsuits can also be costly to the firms since the lawsuits distract managers’ attention and
potentially increase the premiums on D&O insurance.
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Moreover, the resolution of derivative lawsuits often involves stringent corporate gover-
nance reforms. Erickson [2010] finds that more than 80% of the settlements of derivative
lawsuits include reforms of governance practices. These settlements require managers to
appoint or enhance the duties of a lead independent director, to attend a certain percent-
age of board, committee, or shareholder meetings, or to adopt a clawback provision. As a
consequence, the corporate governance reforms that come with derivative lawsuits can limit
managers’ ability to entrench themselves in the firm and reduce their flexibility in making
corporate decisions. Consistent with these arguments, Ferris et al. [2007] find that deriva-
tive lawsuits are not frivolous and are associated with significant improvements in corporate
governance.
Nevertheless, there is a significant procedural hurdle in filing a derivative lawsuit. Specifi-
cally, prior to the filing of a derivative lawsuit, the shareholders of the firm must first demand
that the board of directors bring legal action against the wrongdoers. The demand require-
ment stems from the “cardinal precept” of corporate law that directors, not shareholders,
manage the affairs of a firm (Erickson [2010]). Therefore, it should be the directors who de-
cide whether to initiate the lawsuit for the firm. However, in practice, the majority of board
members (including the CEO) are often named as defendants in derivative lawsuits. Natu-
rally, the directors rarely want to approve the demand. If the board of directors disapproves
the demand, a judge typically follows the board’s decision and dismisses the lawsuit.
To mitigate the board of directors’ conflict of interest arising from the demand require-
ment, many states follow the “demand futility” doctrine. The demand futility doctrine allows
shareholders to bypass the demand requirement and file a derivative lawsuit without the di-
rectors’ approval. To do so, shareholders need to prove that the majority of the directors
cannot impartially judge the necessity of initiating a derivative lawsuit. The demand futility
doctrine has its own problems. In particular, it causes inefficiency in the legal procedure as
the doctrine provides strong incentives for plaintiffs to focus on demonstrating the demand
futility rather than the director and officers’ breach of fiduciary duties (Swanson [1993]).
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To overcome the shortcomings of the demand futility doctrine, 23 U.S. states adopted
universal demand laws between 1989 and 2005. These laws require shareholders to make a
demand in every derivative lawsuit. The demand requirement is determined by the firm’s
state of incorporation regardless of whether the derivative lawsuit is filed in a state or federal
court.2 The adoption of UD laws thus restores the effectiveness of the demand requirement
and helps directors regain control of derivative lawsuits. As a consequence, fewer derivative
lawsuits are filed and the litigation risk pertaining to derivative lawsuits is significantly
reduced in the states that adopted the UD laws. For example, Appel [2016] finds that the
passage of UD laws leads to a one-third decrease in the filing of derivative lawsuits.
3 Hypothesis Development
Shareholder litigation can affect corporate disclosure through the direct role of litigation
risk and indirectly via the role of shareholder litigation as a governance tool.
Prior studies have examined the direct role of litigation risk in shaping corporate dis-
closure policies. For example, Skinner [1994] argues that managers disclose bad news in a
timelier manner to pre-empt shareholder litigation. Kasznik and Lev [1995] find consistent
evidence that firms disclose earnings warnings to avoid large negative earnings news that may
lead to shareholder lawsuits. Recent studies (e.g., Field et al. [2005], Billings and Cedergren
[2015]) also show that early disclosure of earnings-related bad news can reduce litigation risk.
This line of literature suggests that firms are more likely to disclose news, particularly bad
news, when they face high litigation risk. Since UD laws reduce the litigation risk (and thus
the marginal benefit of disclosing bad news), we may expect to observe fewer disclosures, in
particular disclosures of bad news, following the passage of UD laws.
However, there is also empirical evidence showing that more disclosures do not necessarily
protect managers or firms from being sued. For instance, Francis et al. [1994] find that more
2In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services Inc.(1991), the Supreme Court ruled that for derivative lawsuits
filed in federal courts, whether a demand requirement needs to be made or not should be determined by the
laws adopted by the state where the firm is incorporated.
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voluntary disclosures are associated with a higher incidence of shareholder lawsuits. In
fact, after being sued for disclosures made in good faith, managers revise their belief that
pre-emptive disclosures can deter lawsuits, and in turn they reduce the level of voluntary
disclosures (Rogers and Van Buskirk [2009]). Furthermore, Johnson et al. [2001] provide
direct evidence that firms are more willing to make good news disclosures when ex ante
class action litigation risk decreases. These findings are consistent with the argument that
managers are afraid of making forward-looking disclosures because such disclosures can bring
future shareholder lawsuits. In particular, they tend to avoid good news disclosures that may
turn out to be inaccurate or wrong ex post. This is because investors who lose money after
a decrease in share value can bring lawsuits against management for issuing an optimistic
forecast or failing to issue an earnings warning (Cheng and Lo [2006]). These lawsuits can
impose significant costs on the managers and firms, such as reputational damage (Srinivasan
[2005], Brochet and Srinivasan [2014]), distracted attention, and increased D&O insurance
premiums. Hence, if UD laws reduce the likelihood of being sued and the costs conditional
on being sued in derivative lawsuits, firms will also be more willing to share information with
shareholders. In particular, firms with higher ex ante derivative litigation risk or firms that
are more concerned about potential lawsuits related to forward-looking disclosures should
benefit more from a reduction in the litigation risk. For example, it is generally much harder
for firms that operate in more uncertain operating environments to predict future outcomes.
Hence, prior to the adoption of UD laws, these firms may be more worried about being
sued for disclosures that could be viewed as misleading ex post. The adoption of UD laws
alleviates their concerns about potential lawsuits associated with such disclosures, and in
turn they disclose more information to the public.
Moreover, managers’ incentives for disclosure can also be indirectly affected by the weak-
ened role of shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism following the passage of UD
laws.
First, the adoption of UD laws reduces shareholders’ ability to discipline managers via
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shareholder litigation, and such litigation is an integral part of a firm’s corporate governance
structure (Ferris et al. [2007], Cheng et al. [2010]). In order to restore the level of external
monitoring, shareholders may seek other governance mechanisms, such as more corporate
disclosure, to discipline managers. If so, the increase in corporate disclosure should be greater
for firms where derivatives lawsuits were an important governance tool prior to the adoption
of UD laws. For example, firms with dispersed ownership were subject to weaker shareholder
monitoring because shareholder rights such as voting and selling can be effectively exercised
only via concentrated ownership (Thompson [1999], Appel [2016]). As a result, dispersed
shareholders may resort to their ability to bring lawsuits to discipline managers (Crane and
Koch [2017]). Hence, if UD laws reduce the role of derivative lawsuits as a governance
mechanism, the demand for disclosure to monitor managers should also be higher for firms
with dispersed ownership.
However, UD laws may also lead to more managerial entrenchment and increase the
agency costs between managers and shareholders, thereby negatively impacting corporate
disclosure. Appel [2016] shows that managers increase the anti-takeover provisions after the
adoption of UD laws. The resulting increase in managerial entrenchment can in turn alter
managers’ incentives to disclose information. Specifically, entrenched managers may prefer
to share less information with the capital markets because a more transparent information
environment can reduce their private benefits of control (Fu and Liu [2007]). In contrast,
opaqueness can help managers expropriate wealth from shareholders (Jin and Myers [2006],
Ferreira and Laux [2007]). Furthermore, Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003] argue that when
managers are insulated from takeovers, they enjoy the quiet life and avoid making cognitively
difficult decisions. Consequently, managers may provide fewer disclosures to the public
following the passage of UD laws.
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4 Research Design and Sample Construction
4.1 Research Design
We use the staggered adoption of UD laws as a source of plausibly exogenous varia-
tion to shareholder litigation and examine the impact of UD laws on corporate disclosure.
Specifically, we estimate various ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications of the following
generalized difference-in-differences model:
Disclosureist = β0 + β1UD Lawst + Controlsist + αi + θs′ t + γft + ist (1)
where i, s, s
′
, f and t denote firm, state of incorporation, state of location (headquarters),
industry and year, respectively. In the main analysis, we use three different voluntary disclo-
sure measures detailed in the next sub-section as dependent variables. We focus on voluntary
disclosure in the main analysis for two reasons: First, managers have more discretion over
voluntary disclosures than mandatory financial reporting, which allows managers’ changes
in incentives to come into play. Second, the majority of the prior literature on the relation
between litigation risk and corporate disclosure tends to use discretionary disclosures (e.g.,
Kasznik and Lev [1995], Johnson et al. [2001]). Hence, to make our inferences comparable
to those of prior literature, we primarily study managers’ decisions to voluntarily disclose
information. However, in supplemental analyses, we also examine the effect of UD laws on
the quality of mandatory financial reporting.
The independent variable of interest, UD Law, is an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if a state has a UD law in place in year t. We follow Appel [2016] and define whether
a firm is subject to a UD law based on its state of incorporation. Unfortunately, Compustat
provides information only for the most recent state of incorporation, which can introduce
measurement errors into the assignment of treatment versus control firms. To overcome this
problem, we use the historical state of incorporation provided by Bill McDonald to identify
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whether a firm is incorporated in a state with a UD law in a given year.3
In our baseline specification of Equation (1), we include firm fixed effects (αi) and state of
location–year fixed effects (θs′ t).
4 Firm fixed effects account for time-invariant characteristics,
while state-year fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity that varies locally across
time (e.g., local economic conditions). This research design essentially represents a difference-
in-differences approach in which firms incorporated in states that do not have a UD law in
place in a given year serve as the control group for firms incorporated in states that have the
law in place in that year. The coefficient β1 is our difference-in-differences estimate, which
captures the average effect of UD laws for the treatment group relative to the control group.
We also follow Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003] and augment our model with industry-year
fixed effects at the Fama-French 30 industries level (γft). The industry-year fixed effects allow
us to control for unobservable factors that vary at the industry-year level (e.g., investment
opportunities).
In the above baseline specifications, we do not include any time-varying firm-level control
variables because such variables may lead to inconsistent estimates (Gormley and Matsa
[2014]). Instead, we rely on a set of fixed effects to eliminate unobserved time-invariant
factors within firms and unobserved heterogeneity that varies across states and industries.
However, we estimate additional specifications where we also control for a set of variables
that are known to be primary determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions. Specifically, we
follow prior literature and include a set of firm characteristics such as institutional ownership
(Institutional ownership) (Ajinkya et al. [2005], Karamanou and Vafeas [2005]), firm size
(Firm size) (Lang and Lundholm [1993], Kasznik and Lev [1995], Frankel et al. [1995]),
and book-to market ratio (Book-to-market) to capture firms’ incentives for communicating
3Bill McDonald obtained the historical state of incorporation by parsing firms’ 10-K filings on the Elec-
tronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). If the historical state of incorporation is not available on his website, we use the current
state of incorporation from Compustat.
4For simplicity, we refer to the construction state of location–year fixed effects as state–year fixed effects
from now on. Note that we cannot include state of incorporation–year fixed effects in the regressions, as
such fixed effects would, by definition, be perfectly correlated with our treatment variable, UD Law.
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private information to the public (Waymire [1985], Graham et al. [2005]). We also control for
return on assets (ROA), stock return (Stock return), earnings volatility (Earnings volatility),
and a loss indicator (Loss) to take into account the influence of firm performance (e.g., Miller
[2002], Lennox and Park [2006], Chen et al. [2011]). Further, to differentiate the effect of
derivative litigation risk from that of class action litigation risk, we include a continuous
variable, Class action litigation risk, estimated using the procedure developed by Kim and
Skinner [2012].5
Since UD laws are implemented at the state of incorporation level, we cluster standard
errors by the state of incorporation throughout all specifications.6 This conservative cluster-
ing method accounts for potential time-varying correlations in omitted variables that may
affect different firms within the same state (Bertrand et al. [2004]). All continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Appendix C provides detailed definitions for all
our variables.
4.2 Sample Construction
We start the sample with firms in the Compustat-CRSP merged database for 1995 -
2007. We then limit the sample to observations for which we are able to construct the
control variables described in Section 4.1. To construct these control variables, we obtain
financial information from Compustat, institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters, an-
alyst forecasts from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and stock price
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We drop firms incorporated in
foreign countries. Finally, we follow Appel [2016] and exclude firms that changed their state
of incorporation during our sample period.
5Our results are robust to controlling for analyst following (Skinner [1997], Graham et al. [2005]), analyst
forecast bias (Lennox and Park [2006]), analyst forecast dispersion (Cotter et al. [2006]), financial distress
(Frost [1997]), external financing (Frankel et al. [1995]), industry competition (Newman and Sansing [1993]),
insider trading (Cheng and Lo [2006]), stock return volatility (Ali et al. [2004]), and the value-relevance of
earnings (Matsumoto [2002], Hutton [2005]).
6Our results are robust to using alternative clustering methods such as bootstrapping. We report these
robustness checks in Appendix A4.
14
We define our main dependent variable, FreqMF, as the natural logarithm of one plus the
number of management earnings forecasts issued during a given year. We use management
earnings forecast as our main corporate disclosure measure for two reasons. First, manage-
ment earnings forecast is the voluntary disclosure tool that explains the largest fraction of
stock return variance (Beyer et al. [2010]). In addition, Brown et al. [2015] also surveyed
sell-side analysts who acknowledged that management earnings guidance constitutes a very
useful element in establishing their own earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. In
fact, analysts indicated that management earnings guidance is a more useful source of infor-
mation than firms’ recent earnings performance and 10-K/Q filings. Finally, management
earnings forecast is the measure most commonly used in studies pertaining to managers’
corporate disclosure choices (e.g., Shroff et al. [2013], Balakrishnan et al. [2014a], Gow et al.
[2016], Schoenfeld [2017]).
We obtain all managerial annual and quarterly earnings per share (EPS) estimates from
the Company Issued Guidance (CIG) in the First Call Historical Database and restrict our
time period to 1998 – 2007.7 This sample period allows us to identify management forecasts
relatively accurately and mitigates the potential coverage issues of missing data in the earlier
years of the First Call database (Chuk et al. [2013]). We include both qualitative and
quantitative earnings forecasts.8 Our final management forecast sample consists of 30, 873
firm-year observations.
Second, we follow Lo [2014] and use the length of the Management’s Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) sections in 10-K filings as a complementary proxy for the level of corpo-
rate disclosure. While the inclusion of an MD&A section itself is mandatory, the content
is largely at the discretion of the manager (Li [2008], Bloomfield [2008], Loughran and Mc-
Donald [2014]). Recent studies also show that a firm’s disclosure in MD&A has incremental
explanatory power in predicting future performance (Feldman et al. [2010], Li [2010]). This
7We end the sample at 2007, which is two years after the last states adopted the UD laws. This also
helps us to avoid the confounding effect of the recent financial crisis.
8Throughout the paper, we use the terms earnings guidance, earnings forecast, earnings estimate and
management forecast interchangeably.
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evidence suggests that the length of MD&A is a reasonable proxy for the level of value-
relevant voluntary disclosure (Leuz and Schrand [2009]).
We obtain the length of the MD&A sections in 10-K filings from Brown and Tucker
[2011]. Brown and Tucker [2011] retrieve 10-K filings from EDGAR and extract MD&A
from Item 7 in each filing. We define the variable LengthMDA as the natural logarithm of
one plus the number of words in the MD&A section of 10-K filings in a given year.9 Our
final MD&A sample consists of 19, 413 firm-year observations.
Third, we also complement our main disclosure measure with the frequency of 8-K filings.
Prior studies such as Carter and Soo [1999] and Lerman and Livnat [2010] show that 8-K
filings produce information relevant to financial markets and contribute to the price formation
process. In addition, an important feature of 8-K filings is that, although the majority of the
items in the 8-K filings are mandatory, the SEC allows substantial managerial discretion in
filing decisions for several items. Consequently, recent studies have used 8-Ks as a measure
of corporate disclosure (Balakrishnan et al. [2014b], Boone and White [2015], Seo [2016],
Schoenfeld [2017]).
We obtain information on 8-K filings from EDGAR and create two measures: FreqVol8k
and FreqMan8k. We define FreqVol8k as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
voluntary 8-K filings in a given fiscal year. Previous studies argue that there are several items
over which managers have pronounced discretion (Lerman and Livnat [2010], Seo [2016]).
We follow Cooper et al. [2016] and define 8-K filings that contain items 5, 9, and 12 in the
pre-2004 period, and those that contain items 2.02, 7.01, and 8.01 in the post-2004 period, as
voluntary filings.10 Conversely, we define the variable FreqMan8k as the natural logarithm
of one plus the number of other (i.e., non-voluntary) 8-K filings in a given fiscal year. We
use the FreqMan8k variable as a placebo test, for which we do not expect to find changes
9We acknowledge that longer and more complex text may obfuscate rather than inform investors (e.g.,
Li [2008], Bloomfield [2008], Loughran and McDonald [2014]). Thus, we consider the length of the MD&A
filing as a complementary measure for the level of voluntary disclosure.
10The change of regulation pertaining to 8-K filings happened in 2004 and led to the change in the labelling
of items in the post-2004 period.
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or weaker changes in disclosure after the adoption of UD laws. Such a placebo test ensures
that our results primarily represent changes to managers’ incentives for voluntary disclosure.
Our final 8-K filing sample consists of 39, 055 firm-year observations.
We follow Appel [2016] to designate the state of incorporation and event year pertaining
to the passage of UD laws. In Appendix B, we list the years and corresponding states that
adopted UD laws. The adoption of UD laws occurred from 1989 to 2005 across 23 U.S.
states. The most recent states to adopt UD laws are Rhode Island and South Dakota, which
passed the laws in 2005. Since our main disclosure variable, FreqMF, is available only starting
from 1998, we estimate our difference-in-differences coefficient using the last five adopting
states. However, we complement the earnings forecast measure with the two other measures
(LengthMDA and FreqVol8k) that we are able to construct starting from 1995. These two
measures allow us to estimate the coefficient of interest using variation in the litigation
regime of the last 13 adopting states. In Table 1, we report the number of observations for
the states that are eventually in our treatment group during our sample period.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the summary statistics. The mean value of UD Law is
0.169, which implies that 16.9% of firm-years in our sample correspond to observations with
a UD law in place.11 Appel [2016] finds that in the pre-treatment period, observations
from the treatment and control group do not differ economically or statistically in business
fundamentals and governance characteristics. We follow Appel [2016] and compare the mean
value for treatment and control groups at the beginning of our sample period. Specifically,
we exclude firm-year observations that were already treated and compare the value for the
firms that will receive the treatment during our sample period to those that will remain
untreated during the same period. We fail to find that observations from both groups display
statistically significant differences along several observable dimensions including institutional
ownership, book-to-market ratio, stock performance, likelihood of reporting a loss, and class
action litigation risk. We do find, however, that firms in the treatment group are smaller,
11The percentage of treatment firms in our sample is similar to the 16% reported in Appel [2016].
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display better accounting performance, and have lower earnings volatility than those in the
control group.12 The univariate differences are reported in Panel B of Table 2.
In terms of disclosure variables, firms in the treatment group disclose less than those in
the control group in the pre-treatment period. Specifically, the mean of FreqMF is equal to
0.378 for the treatment group and 0.416 for the control group in the pre-treatment period.
For LengthMDA, the mean value is 7.972 (treatment) and 8.444 (control), while it is 0.357
(treatment) and 0.674 (control) for FreqVol8k. Our univariate tests reveal that such differ-
ences are statistically significant for the length of MD&A and frequency of 8-K filings. We
address this concern in two ways. First, we directly test in Section 5 whether the changes
in corporate disclosure precede the adoption of UD laws. Indeed, the key assumption of a
difference-in-differences analysis using plausibly exogenous changes in regulation is not that
the observations in the treatment and control group are similar ex ante, but rather that
they display a parallel trend before the regulation change (Bertrand et al. [2004], Gow et al.
[2016]). Second, we directly examine in Section 6 the exogeneity of the adoption of UD laws
by analyzing whether state-level determinants of corporate disclosure explain the changes in
the litigation regime.
5 Main Results
5.1 UD Laws and Corporate Disclosure
In this sub-section, we examine whether a plausibly exogenous decrease in shareholders’
ability to pursue derivative lawsuits affects firms’ propensity to voluntarily provide informa-
tion to capital markets.
Table 3 presents the results for the impact of UD laws on corporate disclosure using
the three voluntary disclosure measures described in Section 4.2. In columns (1), (2), and
12The observations from our treatment and control groups are not the same as those in Appel [2016]
because we start our sample in 1995 or 1998 due to the availability of our disclosure measures, while his
sample starts in 1987.
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(3), the dependent variable captures the frequency of earnings forecasts. One concern is that
including covariates that may be affected by the treatment can undermine the ability to draw
causal inferences (Gormley and Matsa [2014], Imbens and Rubin [2015]). Hence, in the first
two columns, we do not include any time-varying firm-level covariates. Specifically, in column
(1), we include only firm and state-year fixed effects. The coefficient on UD Law is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that firms in the treatment
group tend to increase the frequency of earnings forecasts after the implementation of UD
laws relative to control firms. In column (2), we augment our model with industry-year fixed
effects to account for unobservable industry characteristics that vary at a yearly frequency.
The magnitude of the coefficient of interest is slightly reduced but remains statistically
significant at the 1% level. Finally, in the third column, we add known determinants of
voluntary disclosure to our empirical model, and our coefficient of interest remains stable
and statistically significant at the 1% level.13
In columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 3, we examine the effect of the adoption of UD laws
on the length of the MD&A section in 10-K filings. Across all specifications, the coefficient
on UD Law is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result shows that
firms in the treatment group tend to increase the length of their MD&A section in 10-K
filings after the implementation of UD laws, relative to firms from the control group.
In columns (7), (8), and (9) of Table 3, we examine the effect of the adoption of UD laws
on the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings over which managers have significant discretion
(Lerman and Livnat [2010], Cooper et al. [2016], Seo [2016]). The coefficient estimate is pos-
itive and statistically significant at conventional statistical levels for all three specifications.
This is evidence that the adoption of UD laws leads to an increase in voluntary disclosure
along another dimension of disclosure. Taken together, the results in Table 3 support our
prediction that firms respond to the decrease in the derivative litigation risk by providing
13Note that the coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs. For example, we find that
the frequency of earnings forecasts is positively related to institutional ownership, firm size, and operating
performance, consistent with Kasznik and Lev [1995], Miller [2002], Ajinkya et al. [2005], and Chen et al.
[2011].
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more corporate disclosures.
We now discuss the economic magnitudes of our finding using the most conservative
specifications in columns (3), (6), and (9). For the main dependent variable, FreqMF, our
estimation reveals that the frequency of management earnings forecasts increases by 12.13%,
an economically meaningful effect.14 Turning to the two complementary disclosure variables,
we see that the length of the MD&A in the 10-K filings increases by 6.67%, while the
frequency of voluntary 8-K filings increases by 7.76%. Hence, our difference-in-differences
coefficient is fairly stable across the three voluntary disclosure measures. To further gauge
the economic magnitude of the effect of UD laws on the level of corporate disclosure, we
compare our estimates with those of other studies looking at plausibly exogenous changes
in managers’ incentives to voluntarily provide information. For example, Schoenfeld [2017]
uses indexing as an unexpected increase in institutional ownership, and he reports that a one
standard deviation increase in the index fund leads to a 20% increase in earnings forecasts
and 8-K filings. Shroff et al. [2013] examine the change in forecasting behavior around
seasoned equity offerings following the 2005 securities offering reform. They find that firms
increase their forecasting frequencies by one-third in the pre-offering period after the reform.
In summary, our results are economically significant and comparable in magnitude to those
from other studies using quasi-natural experimental settings.
There are two potential endogeneity concerns regarding our main results. A first concern
is that the assignment of treatment and control groups is not random (Gow et al. [2016]). In
particular, some regulatory changes may allow firms to choose whether to adopt a new policy.
In our setting, managers do not choose whether or not they receive the treatment after the
change in regulation. Indeed, Appel [2016] finds no evidence of a pattern of re-incorporation
decisions in response to the adoption of UD laws. Hence, the allocation between treatment
14We interpret the economic magnitude in terms of the frequency of management earnings forecasts (Fre-
qMF ). If we estimate the economic significance in terms of the raw number of earnings forecasts, the pas-
sage of UD laws leads to a 28.59% increase in the raw number of earnings forecasts at its sample mean
((exp(0.1213)-1)*[exp(0.5997)/(exp(0.5997)-1)]=0.2859).
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and control groups does not suffer from a selection problem.15
A second concern with the difference-in-differences design is that the change in firm
behavior may precede the change in regulation. To address this concern, we follow Bertrand
and Mullainathan [2003] and decompose the adoption of UD laws into separate time periods
for each state. More specifically, we re-estimate our models from Equation (1) and replace the
UD Law dummy by several indicator variables. For example, UD Law (=-1) is an indicator
variable that takes the value of one for the year before the adoption of UD laws in a given
state. The other dummy variables are defined analogously.
Table 4 reports the corresponding results. We use the same three dependent variables
as in Table 3 and report the model with control variables. For each dependent variable, we
report our results using our most stringent specification including industry-year fixed effects.
In columns (1)-(3), the coefficients on UD Law (= −1) are not statistically different from
zero. This result indicates that the increase in disclosure in terms of earnings forecasts, length
of the MD&A section, and voluntary 8-K filings did not occur before the implementation of
UD laws. Hence, the parallel trend assumption behind the difference-in-differences research
design seems to hold in our setting. In contrast, the coefficient on UD Law (= 0) is positive
and statistically significant at conventional levels for all three disclosure measures. This
suggests that the increase in corporate disclosure started immediately in the adoption year
of UD laws. Further, the coefficient on UD Law (= +1) is positive and statistically significant
at conventional levels for all three voluntary disclosure measures from columns (1) to (3).
Finally, the coefficients on UD Law (>= 2+) are also positive and statistically significant in
columns (1)-(3) of Table 4. UD Law (>= 2+) is an indicator variable that equals one for
the period starting two years after the adoption of a UD law in a given state. This result
thus suggests that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is not short-lived. Overall,
the results in Table 4 suggest that the increase in corporate disclosure does not precede the
passage of UD laws.
15This rests on the assumption that firms’ incorporation decisions were not driven by expected changes in
litigation regime.
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5.2 Evidence on the Channels through Which UD Laws Affect
Corporate Disclosure
In the previous sub-section, we provide robust evidence of a causal effect of the decrease
in the derivative litigation risk on managers’ disclosure decisions. In this sub-section, we
further investigate the channels through which the impact of UD laws on corporate disclosure
takes place. To do so, we examine whether the influence of UD laws on our three voluntary
disclosure measures varies directly with expected litigation costs related to derivative lawsuits
and indirectly with the role of shareholder litigation as a governance tool.
There are two empirical challenges for cross-sectional analyses pertaining to the staggered
adoption of laws. First, firm/industry characteristics on which cross-sectional analyses are
based may be affected by the adoption of laws, which can lead to inconsistent estimates of
the treatment effect (Gormley and Matsa [2011]). To mitigate this concern, we use ex ante
firm/industry characteristics measured in the year prior to the adoption of UD laws to create
subsamples in our cross-sectional analyses.
Second, in a traditional differences-in-differences setting where there is only a single law
change event, the treatment and control groups are uniquely defined. However, in the case
of staggered adoption of laws across different event years, there is more than one law change
event, and a particular observation can serve as a ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ for different
treatment events. The question of how one can measure the ex ante characteristics for the
treatment and control groups then arises. To resolve this problem, we follow Gormley and
Matsa [2011] and Appel [2016] and use a cohort-based matching approach. Specifically, for
each year in which a UD law was passed, we create a cohort consisting of firms incorporated
in the states that adopted the UD law that year and all other firms in states without a
UD law. We keep observations from three years before and after the adoption of the law
for each cohort. We also ensure that control firms are from states that do not have a UD
law throughout the seven-year window. Take the 2001 cohort as an example: the treatment
group includes firms incorporated in Hawaii, the only state that adopted a UD law in 2001;
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the control group consists of firms incorporated in other states without a UD law over
the period of 1998-2004.16 We then classify firms within each cohort based on the cohort
median of the relevant ex ante characteristic (e.g., ex ante derivative lawsuit risk). Finally,
we pool together all firm-year observations that fall above the cohort median of the ex ante
characteristic across cohorts as one subsample, and those below or equal to the cohort median
of the ex ante characteristic as another subsample for comparison.
We begin with our cross-sectional prediction that the effect of UD laws on managers’
disclosure decisions should be stronger for firms with high ex ante derivative lawsuit risk.
To measure a firm’s ex ante derivative lawsuit risk, we estimate the firm’s probability of
being sued in a derivative lawsuit at the end of the year prior to the adoption of UD laws.
Specifically, we follow Kim and Skinner [2012] and estimate the following model:
Suedi,t−1 = β0 + β1Derivative lawsuit industryf,t−1 + β2Log(assets)i,t−2 (2)
+β3Sales growthi,t−2 + β4Returnsi,t−2 + β5Return volatilityi,t−2
+β6Return skewnessi,t−2 + β7Turnoveri,t−2 + 
where t refers to the year that a UD law is adopted. Suedi,t−1 equals one if a firm is sued in
a derivative lawsuit during year t− 1, and zero otherwise. Derivative lawsuit industryf,t−1
takes the value of one if there is a derivative lawsuit during year t − 1 in the industry to
which the firm belongs, and zero otherwise.17 Following Kim and Skinner [2012], we measure
Log(assets)i,t−2 as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of year t − 2
and Sales growthi,t−2 as year t − 2 sales less year t − 3 sales scaled by beginning-of-year
t−2 total assets. Furthermore, we include the firm’s market-adjusted 12-month stock return
16Note that the same firm-year observation can fall into the control group in multiple cohorts (i.e., the
treatment firms are matched to the control firms with replacement).
17Kim and Skinner [2012] use the litigious industries identified by Francis et al. [1994] to measure the
industry-level class action lawsuit risk. Since our objective is to capture the industry-level derivative lawsuit
risk, we modify the original Kim and Skinner model by incorporating whether there is a derivative lawsuit
in the industry to which the firm belongs.
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over year t− 2 (Returnsi,t−2) and the standard deviation (Return volatilityi,t−2) as well as
skewness (Return skewnessi,t−2) of the firm’s 12-month return over year t−2 as explanatory
variables. Finally, we add to the model the 12-month trading volume accumulated over year
t − 2 scaled by year t − 2 outstanding shares (Turnoveri,t−2). We then estimate the above
model over the sample period of 1994-2007 and use the fitted value of the model as a proxy
for the firm’s ex ante derivative lawsuit risk prior to the adoption of UD laws.
After obtaining the proxy for the firm’s ex ante derivative lawsuit risk, we follow the
cohort-based matching approach described above to construct the subsamples. Specifically,
we classify the observations within each cohort into those that fall above the median of
each cohort’s ex ante derivative lawsuit risk and those that fall below or are equal to the
cohort median. Finally, we pool all observations across cohorts with above-cohort-median
(below/equal-to-cohort-median) derivative lawsuit risk as the subsample with high (low) ex
ante derivative lawsuit risk.
In Table 5 Panel A, we compare the disclosure decisions of firms in the high versus low ex
ante derivative risk subsamples. In line with our expectation, the coefficient on UD Law is
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in the high derivative lawsuit risk
subsample (i.e., columns (1), (3), and (5)). This suggests that following the adoption of UD
laws, firms with higher ex ante derivative lawsuit risk significantly increase the frequency of
their management forecasts, the length of their MD&A, and the frequency of their voluntary
8-K filings. In contrast, we find that the effect of UD laws on disclosure is statistically
insignificant for firms facing lower ex ante derivative lawsuit risk in columns (2), (4), and
(6). Furthermore, Wald tests suggest that the differences across the subsamples of high
versus low ex ante derivative lawsuit risk are statistically significant for the frequency of
management forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings at the 1% level.
We next examine how the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure varies with the level
of operating uncertainty that a firm faces. As mentioned in Section 3, it is generally more
difficult for firms that operate in high-uncertainty environments to predict future outcomes.
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Thus, these firms may be more concerned about potential lawsuits related to forward-looking
disclosures that can be viewed as misleading ex post. Hence, a decrease in the derivative
lawsuit risk should have a stronger effect on the level of disclosure for firms operating in high-
uncertainty operating environments. To test this prediction, we first calculate the average
industry standard deviations of sales growth and return on assets over the past ten years
prior to the adoption of UD laws. We then follow the same matching method as above and
classify firms into two subsamples: those from industries with high operating uncertainty
and those from industries with low operating uncertainty. Specifically, we assign a firm into
the subsample of high industry-level operating uncertainty if its average industry standard
deviation of sales growth or return on assets is above the cohort median, and we classify a
firm into the subsample of low industry-level operating uncertainty if its average industry
standard deviations of sales growth and return on assets are below or equal to the cohort
median. We use the standard deviations of sales growth and return on assets to capture
two different aspects of operating uncertainty. Specifically, the standard deviation of sales
growth measures the uncertainty of gross revenue, while the standard deviation of return on
assets captures the uncertainty of net profit including fluctuations in operating cost. This
approach is similar to that of Schrand and Zechman [2012] and Jia et al. [2014], in which
they use multiple aspects to measure CEO overconfidence.18
Our estimates are reported in Table 5 Panel B. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we find
evidence that firms from industries with high operating uncertainty significantly increase
the amount of disclosure after the adoption of UD laws. We fail to document such an
increase for firms from industries with low operating uncertainty in columns (2), (4) and
(6). Furthermore, Wald tests suggest that the differences between high and low operating
uncertainty firms are statistically significant for the frequency of management forecasts at
the 1% level and the length of the MD&A at the 5% level. Taken together, these results
support our prediction that the effect of UD laws on disclosure is concentrated among firms
18Our results are robust if we measure operating uncertainty using the average industry-level earnings
volatility.
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facing high operating uncertainty.
Finally, we analyze whether the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure varies with
firms’ institutional ownership structure. As mentioned in Section 3, shareholder litigation
is likely to be a more important governance tool for firms with dispersed institutional own-
ership, as shareholders of such firms tend to rely more heavily on their litigation rights to
monitor managers. Hence, if disclosure is used as a substitute for shareholder litigation, the
increased difficulty in filing derivative lawsuits after the adoption of UD laws should lead
to a more pronounced increase in disclosure for firms with more dispersed shareholders. To
test this prediction, we define institutional ownership dispersion as minus one times the sum
of the squares of the percentage of individual institutional ownership for a firm over the
year prior to the adoption of UD laws and again follow the cohort-based matching approach
described above. We compare the subsamples of firm-year observations with above-cohort-
median institutional ownership dispersion (high institutional ownership dispersion) versus
those with below- or equal-to-cohort-median institutional ownership dispersion (low institu-
tional ownership dispersion).
The corresponding results are reported in Table 5 Panel C. In columns (1), (3) and (5),
our estimates reveal that, in line with our prediction, firms with more dispersed ownership
significantly increase their amount of disclosure after the adoption of UD laws. However, the
results are statistically insignificant for firms with less dispersed ownership (see columns (2),
(4) and (6)). Furthermore, Wald tests suggest that the differences between firms with high
and low institutional ownership dispersion are statistically significant for the frequency of
management forecasts and the length of the MD&A at the 1% level, and for the frequency
of voluntary 8-K filings at the 10% level.19
19In terms of the economic importance of the direct and indirect channels, if we focus on our main disclosure
measure (i.e., the frequency of management forecasts), it seems that the indirect channel (i.e., institutional
ownership dispersion) is the most important channel. Specifically, the coefficient on UD Law is larger in
column (1) of Table 5 Panel C than in column (1) of Table 5 Panels A and B.
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5.3 Overall Disclosure Level vs. Opportunistic Disclosure Behav-
ior
So far, we have shown that UD laws lead to an increase in corporate disclosure. However,
we have been silent on the nature of this change. For example, we do not know whether
the decrease in the derivative litigation risk affects the overall disclosure level or managers’
opportunistic disclosure behavior. Such an investigation can further shed light on how exactly
shareholder litigation facilitates or deters corporate disclosure and whether the change in the
litigation regime provides benefits to the capital markets. If high shareholder litigation risk
reduces managers’ willingness to share information, the switch to a low litigation risk regime
helps investors obtain more information. Thus, we should expect the positive effect of UD
laws to hold for both good and bad news disclosures, and both optimistic and pessimistic
disclosures.
To understand the nature of the increase in corporate disclosure following the passage
of UD laws, we begin with the analysis of the impact of UD laws on various management
forecast properties in Table 6. We first decompose earnings forecasts into good news and bad
news forecasts. Good and bad news forecasts are defined relative to the analyst consensus
estimates prior to the management earnings forecasts. If high shareholder litigation risk
suppresses the overall level of disclosure, the passage of UD laws should have a positive
effect on both good news and bad news forecasts in a similar manner. However, if high
litigation risk incentivizes managers to provide more bad news (Skinner [1994]), we should
expect managers to opportunistically reduce bad news forecasts after the adoption of UD
laws. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the corresponding results. The coefficient on UD
Law is significant and positive for both good news and bad news forecasts.20 Furthermore,
20In defining good and bad news, we focus on economically meaningful management earnings forecasts
(Kothari et al. [2009], Das et al. [2012]). Specifically, we define a management forecast as good news (bad
news) if the difference between management forecast and consensus analyst forecast scaled by the absolute
value of consensus analyst forecast is greater than 10% (smaller than -10%). We apply the same cutoff in
defining optimistic or pessimistic management earnings forecasts. We drop observations if their absolute
value of analyst consensus forecast (or absolute value of reported actual earnings) is no greater than 0.01.
Furthermore, our results are not affected if we follow Li and Zhang [2015] and adjust forecast news using
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the Wald test suggests that the difference between good news and bad news forecasts is not
statistically significant. These results indicate that the decrease in the derivative litigation
risk does not lead managers to opportunistically disclose less bad news. In contrast, managers
improve the overall level of disclosure by increasing both good news and bad news disclosures
after the adoption of UD laws.
Second, we classify earnings forecasts into optimistic and pessimistic forecasts. Opti-
mistic forecasts are those that exceed realized earnings, while pessimistic forecasts are below
realized earnings. We do so because the effect of the derivative litigation risk on the biases
of management forecasts could be asymmetric. Specifically, it is likely that managers are
afraid of being sued for making optimistic earnings forecasts that are not realized, but it is
unlikely that investors would take legal action against managers for being too pessimistic
and achieving higher earnings than expected. Thus, managers would strategically shy away
from optimistic earnings forecasts when facing high litigation risk. If the adoption of UD
laws leads to more opportunistic disclosure behavior as opposed to an overall increase in
disclosure, we should observe an increase only in optimistic forecasts, not in pessimistic fore-
casts. However, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, we find evidence that UD laws increase
both optimistic and pessimistic forecasts. Furthermore, the Wald test suggests that the
difference between optimistic and pessimistic forecasts is not statistically significant. Taken
together, these findings further support the argument that the reduced derivative litigation
risk increases the overall level of information disclosed by managers.
Finally, we examine whether low shareholder litigation risk improves the precision of
management earnings forecasts. We do so because managers may have more discretion over
the quality of their earnings forecasts than whether to provide the forecasts. In particular,
due to managers’ fiduciary duty to update and correct previous disclosures, they cannot
always withhold information (Hirst et al. [2008]). Furthermore, prior studies (Baginski et al.
[2002; 2007]) suggest that the usefulness of management forecasts increases with the preci-
the methodology proposed in Rogers and Van Buskirk [2013].
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sion of the forecast. Column (9) Table 6 presents the corresponding results. The dependent
variable in column (9) is the width of the forecast errors (WidthMF ). The smaller the width,
the more precise the forecast. The coefficient on UD Law is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level, suggesting that the passage of UD laws improves the precision of
management earnings forecasts.
So far we have focused on firms’ voluntary disclosure, in particular management earnings
forecasts, to examine the impact of UD laws on corporate disclosure. However, Ball et al.
[2012] argue that mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure are complements,
and they are two integral parts of firms’ information environment. Consistent with this
argument, they find that higher-quality mandatory financial reporting is associated with
more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative management forecasts. To explore
the impact of UD laws on the quality of mandatory financial reporting, we use the level
of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model. Table 7 presents the results
pertaining to the effect of UD laws on the level of discretionary accruals. In columns (1) and
(2), we include only fixed effects and find that the coefficient on UD Law is negative and
significant at conventional levels. We further include determinants of mandatory disclosure
quality in column (3). Again, we find that the passage of UD laws leads to a decrease in
the level of discretionary accruals, which indicates that UD laws also improve the quality of
mandatory financial reporting.
Our analysis of discretionary accruals also serves two other purposes: First, we include
all firm-year observations from 1989 to 2007 in the discretionary accruals regression, which
covers the universe of U.S. states that adopted UD laws.21 We thus fully exploit the staggered
adoption of UD laws and alleviate the concern that our results are driven by a few states that
experience the changes in the laws. Second, the positive effect of UD laws on the quality of
mandatory financial reporting also provides further evidence that high shareholder litigation
21We delete firms in the financial services (SIC 6000–6999) and utilities industries (SIC 4900–4949) in the
analysis of discretionary accruals, as accounting rules are significantly different for these regulated industries.
However, our results are not affected if we keep these industries in the sample.
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risk does not necessarily discipline managers’ opportunistic behavior, and thus the reduction
in shareholder litigation risk does not lead to more opportunistic reporting.
6 Additional Analyses
6.1 Sensitivity Analyses
In this sub-section, we perform several sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our
results. We start by re-estimating our main effects by excluding various states from our
sample. We report these results in Appendix Table A1. In columns (1)-(3), we exclude firms
incorporated in the U.S. states that adopted UD laws before the first year of the sample
period for the three voluntary disclosure measures. Specifically, we remove observations
before 1998 for the management earnings forecast sample and before 1995 for the MD&A and
8-K filings samples. This test aims at mitigating the concern that stale firm-year observations
over the sample period may drive the results. Dropping these observations does not affect
our findings. In particular, the coefficient on UD Law remains positive and statistically
significant at conventional levels for all three voluntary disclosure measures.
Second, Houston et al. [2015] argue that the 1999 ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals raises the hurdle of filing class action lawsuits against firms headquartered in
the states of the Ninth Circuit Court. To ensure that our main result is not driven by the
changes in the legal environment pertaining to class action lawsuits, we further exclude firms
headquartered in states from the Ninth Circuit Court from our sample. As shown in columns
(4)-(6), the effect of UD laws on the three voluntary disclosure measures remains positive
and statistically significant at conventional levels.
Third, we exclude from our sample observations from firms that are incorporated in Penn-
sylvania. We do so because, as reported in Table 1, Pennsylvania is the treated state with
the largest number of firm-year observations over our sample period. We tabulate our results
in columns (7)-(9). The coefficient on UD Law remains positive and statistically significant
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at conventional levels across our three voluntary disclosure measures. This mitigates the
concern that our results might be driven mostly by the largest state that adopted a UD law
in the sample.
Finally, we acknowledge that about 50% of the publicly listed firms that appear in our
sample are incorporated in Delaware. To ensure that the inclusion of Delaware firms in our
control group does not drive our results, we re-estimate Equation (1) and drop these firms
from the sample. The results in columns (10)-(12) show that our findings remain qualitatively
similar if we drop firms incorporated in Delaware. Specifically, the coefficient on UD Law is
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels for all three disclosure measures.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the use of 8-K filings as a disclosure measure presents an
interesting feature. It has both voluntary and mandatory components, which allows us to
perform a placebo test. Specifically, if the decrease in the litigation risk mainly impacts
voluntary disclosures provided by managers, we should not find any change or perhaps only
an economically weak change in the frequency of mandatory 8-K filings following the imple-
mentation of UD laws. We directly test this prediction and estimate our main specification
using the frequency of mandatory 8-K filings, FreqMan8k, as the dependent variable. The
results are reported in Appendix Table A2, where we perform the same three specifications
as in Table 3. Our difference-in-differences estimate is close to zero and not statistically
significant at conventional levels. This placebo test thus provides further evidence that the
adoption of UD laws primarily affects managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions.
Throughout our analyses, we have defined industry-year fixed effects using the Fama-
French 30 classification. To ensure that our results are not driven by a single industry
classification, we redefine our industry-year fixed effects using the Fama-French 12 and SIC
two-digit industry classifications and repeat our main tests from Table 3. We report the
corresponding results in Appendix Table A3. The estimates on UD Law remain positive and
statistically significant at conventional levels.
Throughout the paper, we have clustered our standard errors at the state of incorpora-
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tion level to account for potential serial correlation among groups that we use to define our
treatment variable (Bertrand et al. [2004]). One concern with finite samples is that a small
number of clusters may over-estimate the precision of our coefficient of interest. However,
Bertrand et al. [2004] suggest that the differences-in-differences estimator performs well in
finite samples when the number of clusters equals 50, while we have more than 50 clusters
(52). Nevertheless, to ensure the robustness of our results, we repeat our main tests from
Table 3 using alternative clustering methods. We report the corresponding results in Ap-
pendix Table A4. First, we follow Mooney and Duval [1993] and perform 50 bootstrapped
replications for the main specification with the three voluntary disclosure measures. The
sample drawn for each replication is a bootstrapped sample of clusters using the states of
incorporation. Our results, reported in columns (1)-(3), remain statistically significant at
conventional levels. Second, in columns (4)-(6), we cluster our standard errors at the firm
level. This approach is not as conservative as our main approach as it does not account for
serial correlation within states over time. Our difference-in-differences estimates remain sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. Third, in columns (7)-(9), we cluster our standard
errors at the state of incorporation-year level (Chaney et al. [2012]). While this approach
does not account for time-series correlation, it increases the number of clusters. Our results
remain unaffected. Finally, we also follow Cameron et al. [2011] and cluster our standard
errors using two separate dimensions, at the state of incorporation and year levels. Our
estimates are reported in columns (10)-(12). Overall, our results are not sensitive to varying
the clustering dimensions.
6.2 Adoption of UD Laws and State-level Corporate Disclosure
Environment
Appel [2016] does not find that firms endogenously choose to incorporate in U.S. states
where UD laws are in place. However, one may argue that the adoption of UD laws could
be affected by time-varying state-level factors. These factors can bias our estimates if they
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are also correlated with the corporate disclosure environment in a given state. To mitigate
the concern that the adoption of UD laws is endogenous with respect to the state-level
corporate disclosure environment, we aggregate the determinants of disclosure decisions (e.g.,
institutional ownership, stock return) at the state-year level and regress the passage of UD
laws on these state-year level factors.
Appendix Table A5 presents the corresponding results. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if a state passes a UD law in a given year.
We use the treated states prior to the adoption of UD laws and conduct the analysis at the
state-year level, which leads to a small number of observations. Given the small sample size,
adding fixed effects in a probit model can produce inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge [2002]).
To tackle this issue, we follow Wooldridge [2002] and use a Chamberlain’s Random Effects
(CRE) probit model. Specifically, in addition to the state-year level disclosure determinants,
we include the state means of all disclosure determinants as additional control variables to
account for unobservable state fixed effects. Appendix Table A5 shows that none of the
coefficients on the state-year level disclosure determinants are significant, suggesting that
the adoption of a UD law is not endogenous to the factors that drive corporate disclosure
decisions at the state level.
7 Conclusion
Prior research that examines the relation between shareholder litigation risk and corpo-
rate disclosure is susceptible to measurement errors and endogenous concerns. In this paper,
we take advantage of a plausibly exogenous shock to shareholder litigation risk and examine
its effect on corporate disclosure. Using various disclosure measures, we find strong evidence
that in response to the reduced derivative litigation risk, firms issue more earnings forecasts
and voluntary 8-K filings, as well as increase the length of the MD&A section in their 10-K
filings. We thus provide evidence of a causal effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate
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disclosure.
Furthermore, we view shareholder litigation as an integral part of corporate governance
and investigate its direct and indirect effects on corporate disclosure. We find that expected
costs associated with shareholder litigation are the direct channel through which shareholder
litigation risk influences corporate disclosure. Furthermore, shareholder litigation also affects
corporate disclosure indirectly via its role as a governance tool. In particular, the impact
of shareholder litigation on corporate disclosure is more pronounced for firms for which
shareholder litigation is a more important mechanism to discipline managers.
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Table 1: Observations per Treated States
(1) (2) (3)
States MF Sample MDA Sample 8K Sample
North Carolina 360 184 448
Arizona 116 71 140
Nebraska 34 14 46
Connecticut 154 95 228
Maine 43 25 69
Pennsylvania 981 529 1,193
Texas 743 527 972
Wyoming 15 4 20
Idaho 30 16 28
Hawaii 38 17 47
Iowa 102 52 130
Massachusetts 671 409 919
Rhode Island 64 43 87
South Dakota 29 7 35
Total 3,380 1,993 4,362
This table lists the number of observations per state that adopted universal demand (UD)
laws over our sample period of 1995-2007, except for management forecasts, which we start
in 1998 following Chuk et al. [2013]. In columns (1), (2), and (3), we report the number of
observations per treated state for our samples of management forecasts, MD&A, and 8-K
filings, respectively.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75
FreqMF 30,873 0.5997 0.8451 0.0000 0.0000 1.0986
LengthMDA 19,413 8.5767 0.6824 8.1056 8.6268 9.0828
FreqVol8k 39,055 1.1018 0.9325 0.0000 1.0986 1.9459
UD Law 39,055 0.1688 0.3745 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Institutional ownership 39,055 0.3972 0.2865 0.1328 0.3774 0.6357
Firm size 39,055 5.6746 2.1009 4.1170 5.6267 7.1208
Book-to-market 39,055 0.6288 0.4817 0.3110 0.5140 0.7906
ROA 39,055 0.0149 0.1631 0.0042 0.0345 0.0823
Stock return 39,055 0.0399 0.5982 -0.3020 -0.0458 0.2352
Earnings volatility 39,055 0.1232 0.2440 0.0219 0.0499 0.1169
Loss 39,055 0.2301 0.4209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Class action litigation risk 39,055 0.1254 0.1368 0.0068 0.0615 0.2342
Panel B: Ex Ante Characteristics
Variables Eventually Treated Never Treated Difference
FreqMF 0.3776 0.4162 -0.0386
LengthMDA 7.9722 8.4443 -0.4721***
FreqVol8k 0.3570 0.6739 -0.3168***
Institutional ownership 0.3157 0.3477 -0.0320
Firm size 4.9961 5.4522 -0.4562**
Book-to-market 0.5654 0.5810 -0.0156
ROA 0.0359 -0.0052 0.0412**
Stock return 0.0519 0.0535 -0.0016
Earnings volatility 0.0981 0.1781 -0.0799***
Loss 0.2149 0.2782 -0.0633
Class action litigation risk 0.1175 0.1302 -0.0126
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the dependent and independent vari-
ables used in our empirical analyses. Our sample period covers the years 1995-2007 except
for FreqMF, for which we start in 1998 following Chuk et al. [2013]. Detailed variable defini-
tions are in Appendix C. Panel B of Table 2 presents the univariate comparisons between the
pre-treatment values for firms incorporated in UD states (“eventually treated”) and those
incorporated elsewhere (“never treated”) during the sample period of 1998-2007. We exclude
observations that were already treated at the beginning of our sample period and compare
firm-year observations that will eventually receive the treatment to those that will never
receive it during the sample period. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix C. *, **,
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Trend Tests of UD Laws on Corporate Disclosure
(1) (2) (3)
FreqMF LengthMDA FreqVol8k
UD Law (= −1) 0.0172 0.0373 0.0023
(0.73) (1.21) (0.14)
UD Law (= 0) 0.0810*** 0.0914** 0.0660*
(3.88) (2.46) (1.71)
UD Law (= +1) 0.1433*** 0.0858*** 0.1019***
(4.58) (2.94) (2.77)
UD Law (>= +2) 0.1456*** 0.0791*** 0.0762**
(4.52) (3.35) (2.29)
Institutional ownership 0.2091*** 0.0492 0.2411***
(5.29) (1.53) (6.98)
Firm size 0.1736*** 0.0412*** 0.0185**
(21.55) (7.65) (2.53)
Book-to-market 0.0316*** 0.0364*** -0.0526***
(3.31) (6.70) (-4.08)
ROA 0.0960** -0.1360*** -0.1398***
(2.61) (-3.27) (-3.58)
Stock return -0.0233*** -0.0047 0.0050
(-6.85) (-1.07) (0.91)
Earnings volatility -0.0239 0.0240 0.1029**
(-0.79) (0.66) (2.30)
Loss -0.0709*** 0.0360*** -0.0045
(-6.37) (2.91) (-0.49)
Class action litigation risk 0.0207 0.0233 0.0339*
(0.89) (1.14) (1.71)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 30,873 19,413 39,055
R2 0.6514 0.8591 0.7187
This table reports the trend tests pertaining to the impact of UD laws on the frequency of
management earnings forecasts, length of MD&A section, and frequency of voluntary 8-K filings.
The dependent variable is FreqMF in column (1), LengthMDA in column (2), and FreqVol8k in
column (3). Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix C. Robust t-statistics are reported in
parentheses and calculated using standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation level.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: The Impact of UD Laws on the Quality of Mandatory Disclosure
(1) (2) (3)
DisAcc DisAcc DisAcc
UD Law -0.0099** -0.0085* -0.0079*
(-2.34) (-1.89) (-1.76)
Institutional ownership -0.0432***
(-6.39)
Firm size -0.0058***
(-3.95)
Book-to-market -0.0343***
(-16.87)
ROA 0.0516***
(5.00)
Stock return 0.0068***
(4.76)
Earnings volatility 0.0294***
(3.55)
Loss -0.0051*
(-1.84)
Class action litigation risk 0.0068
(1.57)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
N 42,565 42,565 42,565
R2 0.1917 0.2155 0.2284
This table reports the impact of UD laws on the level of discretionary accruals. We calculate the
level of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model. Detailed variable definitions
are in Appendix C. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses and calculated using standard
errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix A2: The Impact of UD Laws on the Frequency of Mandatory 8-Ks
(1) (2) (3)
FreqMan8k FreqMan8k FreqMan8k
UD Law 0.0413 0.0398 0.0391
(1.46) (1.28) (1.26)
Institutional ownership 0.2740***
(5.75)
Firm size -0.0178***
(-2.73)
Book-to-market -0.0725***
(-6.25)
ROA -0.0860***
(-3.08)
Stock return 0.0125*
(1.97)
Earnings volatility 0.0280
(0.49)
Loss 0.0034
(0.39)
Class action litigation risk -0.0125
(-0.64)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
N 39,055 39,055 39,055
R2 0.7278 0.7300 0.7310
This table reports the impact of UD laws on the frequency of mandatory 8-K filings. Detailed
variable definitions are in Appendix C. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses and
calculated using standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix A5: Adoption of UD Laws and State-level Disclosure Environment
(1)
UD Law
Institutional ownership 10.7924
(0.97)
Firm size 1.0559
(0.88)
Book-to-market -2.0458
(-1.13)
ROA 0.3603
(0.03)
Stock return 2.3004
(1.58)
Earnings volatility 3.3424
(0.85)
Loss -1.4966
(-0.35)
Class action litigation risk 5.1259
(0.78)
N 72
Pseudo-R2 0.2473
This table reports the endogeneity test regarding the state-level disclosure determinants for
the adoption of UD laws. The independent variables are the average disclosure determinants
within each state of incorporation level and year. The state mean of each variable is also
included but not reported for brevity. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses and
calculated using standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix B: Adoption of Universal Demand (UD) Laws
State Year Reference
Georgia 1989 Georgia Code Ann. § 14-2-742
Michigan 1989 Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1493a
Florida 1990 Florida Stat. Ann. § 607.07401
Wisconsin 1991 Wisconsin Stat. Ann. § 180.742
Montana 1992 Montana Code Ann. § 35-1-543
Virginia 1992 Virginia Code Ann. § 13.1-672.1B
Utah 1992 Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)
New Hampshire 1993 New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.42
Mississippi 1993 Mississippi Code Ann. § 79-4-7.42
North Carolina 1995 North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 55-7-42
Arizona 1996 Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-742
Nebraska 1996 Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 21-2072
Connecticut 1997 Connecticut Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-722
Maine 1997 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-C, § 753
Pennsylvania 1997 Cuker v. Mikalauskas (547 Pennsylvania. 600, 692 A.2d 1042)
Texas 1997 Texas Bus. Org. Code Ann. 607.07401
Wyoming 1997 Wyoming Stat. § 17-16-742
Idaho 1998 Idaho Code § 30-1-742
Hawaii 2001 Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 414-173
Iowa 2003 Iowa Code Ann. § 490.742
Massachusetts 2004 Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 156D, § 7.42
Rhode Island 2005 Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 7-1.2-710(C)
South Dakota 2005 South Dakota Codified Laws 47-1A-742
This table lists the states that adopted universal demand (UD) laws and the corresponding
years as in Appel [2016].
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